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Abstract. The paper considers the problem of constructing a full group of failure scenarios 
for physical infrastructures when subjected to cyber attacks (CAs). Physical infrastructures 
actually are systems of systems, or network of networks [1]. The main idea of the research 
rests on the assumption, that in order to damage any physical infrastructure by a cyber attack, 
it has to be able to produce a powerful enough physical impact on the most vulnerable part(s) 
of the infrastructure. Only civil engineering and industrial structures and installations 
connected to Internet and World Wide Web are considered. Hence, all infrastructures 
discussed below have to be elements of the Enterprise IoT or IoT, namely: electrical grids, oil, 
gas and product pipeline systems, water supply and disposal (waste) systems, rail networks, 
air traffic control and telecommunications (finance, commerce, business) networks, etc. 
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КИБЕРБЕЗОПАСНОСТЬ КРИТИЧНЫХ ФИЗИЧЕСКИХ 
ИНФРАСТРУКТУР 
Аннотация. В статье рассматривается проблема построения полной группы сценариев 
отказов для физических инфраструктур, когда они подвергаются кибератакам. 
Физические инфраструктуры на самом деле представляют собой системы систем или 
сети сетей [1]. Основная идея исследования основывается на предположении, что для 
того, чтобы повредить любую физическую инфраструктуру в результате кибератаки 
необходимо оказать достаточно мощное физическое воздействие на наиболее уязвимые 
части инфраструктуры. Рассматриваются только гражданские инженерные и 
промышленные сооружения и установки, подключенные к Интернету и Всемирной 
паутине. Следовательно, все инфраструктуры, обсуждаемые ниже, должны быть 
элементами корпоративного Интернета вещей (IoT) или IoT, а именно: электрические 
сети, системы трубопроводов нефти, газа и продуктов, системы водоснабжения и 
удаления отходов (отходы), железнодорожные сети, управление воздушным движением 
и телекоммуникационные (финансы, коммерция, бизнес) сети и др. 
Ключевые слова: кибербезопасность, критические инфраструктуры, кибератаки, 
интернет вещей. 
Introduction 
The history of cyber attacks on infrastructures started in early 1980s, 
when the Internet wasn't existing, and is in the process of shaping itself. In one 
of the very first official reports on small-scale cyber attack attempts against 
various U.S. electrical utilities [2], results are described of surveys of 15 cyber 
attacks and incidents over a period of three decades (sic, since 1982). None of 
them have caused significant damage or disruption [2]. At the same time a group 
of hackers installed a Trojan into the SCADA system which controlled a 
Siberian pipeline, which resulted in a powerful blast. The identity of the hackers 
was identified only 22 years later, when DoD USA Secretary under R. Reagan, 
Thomas Read published his book "At the Abyss: An Insider's History of the Cold 
War" from which we learned that the attack was organized by the CIA. This and 
all cases without reference described below come from the Internet source [3]. 
The next incident is dated by 1992 when a fired Chevron worker 
penetrated computers of the company in New York and San Jose and 
reprogrammed them for allowing leaks of poisonous gases from Chevron 
installations. This man-made hazard exposed thousands of workers to potential 
danger for 10 hours, before the system was restored for normal safe operation. 
Other accidents involving cyber attacks were recorded in 1994 (the Salt River 
Project, where removal of files responsible for monitoring and logistics led to 
interruptions of serving electricity and water, and compromising personal and 
financial data), In 1997, the Worcester (Massachusetts, USA) airport was under 
attack that resulted in a six hour disruption of telephone communication at the 
dispatcher tower, fire fighters quarters and airport carriers' offices. In 1999 the 
Russian company Gasprom was attacked by hackers who, using help from an 
insider, used a Trojan to disrupt SCADA performance that controlled gas 
supply. The intrusion was curbed very early, without any serious consequences.  
In 2000 a former employee of the Maroochy Water System (Australia) got 
two years in jail for hacking company's computers that controlled water supply 
that resulted in millions of liters of sewage entering an adjacent fresh water river 
and flooding of a hotel. In 2001 a US gas processing company was hacked by a 
supplier who did this to hide his logistics mistake. As a result gas supply was 
switched off in several European countries. In 2002 the PDVSA oil company in 
Venezuela was attacked during a strike. As result, its output went down from 
3mln.b/day to 370 thousand b/day. In 2006 two engineers, experts in road traffic 
hacked out of protest the Los Angeles traffic lights, by making them stay red all 
the time that led to serious traffic jams. In 2008 a 14-year old student did the 
same with the tram (city cars) in Lodz, Poland. As a result, four trains went off 
track, 12 people were traumatized. In 2012 the offices of the world largest oil 
company, Saudi Aramco, was attacked grounding 30 thousand computers. 
Responsibility for this cyber attack was taken by a group that called itself "The 
Sword of Justice." In two weeks after that attack, the RamGas Company of 
Qatar was attacked by the same type of virus. As the result, the internal 
corporate web and its website were out of order for several days. Starting late in 
2009, several U.S. natural gas pipeline operators came under a barrage of highly 
sophisticated cyber attacks related to industrial espionage, but they could be 
precursors to cyber attacks and/or physical attack [4]. In 2014 a German 
metallurgical facility was attacked by hackers who were able using social 
engineering to get access to an employee's computer through which they got 
access to the control system of a blast furnace. As the result the furnace could 
not be shut down, which resulted in great losses. In 2015 Ukraine's electrical 
grid was hacked and 600 thousand citizens were left without electricity. 
The first in history massive cyber attack on a cyber system happened in 
2007 in Estonia, when websites of its Parliament, ministries, banks, newspapers 
and other mass-media organizations, as well as the national system of processing 
telecommunication services and financial orders, went down. It was alleged that 
Russia is responsible for the incident.   
The diagnosed malicious virus programs that were being used in the 
attacks were SQL Slammer that was tailored to attack data base servers (cases: 
US oil company, a major US automobile company). A hospital in Great Britain 
was attacked by virus Mytob. Virus Nimda was responsible for attacking a US 
food producing company. Air Canada, Mitsubishi Electric (sensitive inspection 
data about its two nuclear power plants were leaked as the result), Cook County, 
DOT, Illinois, USA were attacked by different viruses that were not made 
public.  
The up to date first, largest and most elaborate cyber attack, that actually 
lead to significant physical damage of the infrastructure, was executed by a 
worm program called Stuxnet, on the Iranian centrifuge cascade for nuclear 
isotope separation in Natanz, Iran (Fig.1). The attack (which took place in 2008-
2010) was preceded by extensive remote clandestine cyber 
diagnostics/monitoring of the target. Stuxnet gathered detailed information 
about the centrifuges and their control system, providing the basis for the 
development of a precisely-tailored worm attack tool. The general belief (not 
supported, as yet, by any fully trustable documents) is that Stuxnet was 
developed and inserted in the centrifuge cascade system by a concerted effort of 
the USA and Israel.  
On the surface, Stuxnet was able to deceive the SCADA as to the true 
state of the centrifuge operating parameters at the same time that the centrifuges 
were forced to operate at speeds well over design values and, alleged, 
continuously changing the frequency of their spinning in time, thus causing the 
fatigue phenomenon in its mechanical parts and subsequent fast accumulation of 
high-cycle fatigue damage and rupture of its crucial details. Published damage 
estimates related to the centrifuges per se and the isotope separation process 
vary [5]. 
Some Definitions 
For better understanding of the following, we start with a short description 
of some elements of infrastructure networks theory. From the point of topology, 
a network consists of nodes and links that connect the nodes in a specific 
fashion. The nodes represent the points of supply/origin and points of 
destination/ consumption. The links represent the routes of 
transmission/movement. The whole set of nodes and links comprises a network. 
A broad set of manmade, natural, and social systems can be represented and 
analyzed as this kind of transportation networks. Infrastructure networks are 
complex, irregular; and statistical in nature. Large networks can be classified as 
exponential networks (highly connected nodes are exponentially unlikely) and 
power-law networks (as they, typically, do not contain dominant nodes). In the 
first type of networks most of the nodes have approximately the same number of 
links. These kinds of networks are descriptively named as uniform-random 
networks URN (see Fig. 1).  
In the second broad class of networks most nodes are connected to nodes 
that already have a considerable number of connections. This feature lead to 
describe them as scale-free networks (in the sense of number connections per 
node).The more descriptive term for this kind of networks is hub-and-spoke 
random network HASN (see Fig. 2).  
 
Figure 1. A typical uniform-random network infrastructure 
  
Figure 2. A scale-free infrastructure network 
A cyber attack that disables a randomly picked node from the URN (Fig. 
1) typically would disconnect only a few other nodes that are connected only to 
the disabled one. A random disablement in the hub-and- spoke network would 
likely do even less damage, since so few nodes have any other node that 
connects only through them. However, in the worst case scenario for the scale- 
free network (when several nodes are disabled, see Fig. 2), the damage will be 
greater than in a similar scenario for the exponential network.  
Cyber Networks 
The Internet, like practically our entire society, is critically dependent on 
electric supply. Both the Internet and World Wide Web (WWW) are scale-free 
networks. WWW is the very first truly planetary scale digital infrastructure 
(Fig.3). 
  
Figure 3. Russian computer network (RUNET) integrated into the global network [7] 
Scale-free networks emerge usually through natural growth, as new nodes 
link preferentially to old nodes that are already highly linked. It is interesting 
that China didn't connect to WWW, it operates its own separate network, 
protected by a wall from WWW. 
 
Figure 4. Backbone network of the Russian JSC Rostelecom [8] 
 Figure 5. Backbone of a new Russian digital communication operator [9] 
Currently, due to the observed weaponization of the Internet and WWW, 
they are subjected to particularly intense study of their capabilities, strengths and 
vulnerabilities [10]. Table 1 shows that the cyber content rests on a structure of 
physical elements that have physical properties and locations. It can be easily 
observed that cyberspace itself, like any other infrastructure, has its own 
geography and topology (the latter not identical with that of the network layers), 
and both affect its vulnerability and, hence, resilience.  
Table 1 
Schematic Description of Levels Involved in Cyberspace [1] 
Level Description Examples 
Cyber Intellectual content  Data, commands, knowledge, ideas, mental 
 Logical 
net 
Services employing 
physical signals to 
carry logical messages 
Telephones, broadcast radio and TV services, cable 
TV service, public Internet, private Internet protocol 
(IP)– based networks carried on common-carrier 
infrastructure, private-infrastructure IP- based 
networks, supervisory control and data acquisition 
networks 
Hard net Infrastructures formed 
from base elements that 
carry electrical or 
electromagnetic signals 
Common-carrier telecommunications networks, 
tactical radio systems, dedicated wire line systems, 
community cable systems, cell phone systems 
Base Physical elements that 
underlie 
telecommunications 
services 
Cable networks, optical fiber, coaxial cable, radio 
transmitters and receivers, radio transmission paths, 
communications satellites, Internet routers, modems 
 
Internet nodes consist of computers (or devices that incorporate 
computers). Nodes are connected to an Internet service provider (ISP), which 
offers a connection to its hub or server bank (a cluster of high-speed computers) 
via some kilometers of telephone wire, coaxial cable, fiber optic cable, wireless 
cellular radio link, or satellite radio link. In their entirety, all these components 
comprise the current Internet architecture as a scale-free HAS network 
resembling that shown in Fig.2.  
Scale-free networks are, for reasons described above, robust in the face of 
random or untargeted failures, which fall most heavily, according to laws of 
statistics, on the large numbers of nodes with only a few connections, and, 
hence, has scarcely any discernible effect on the overall network performance. 
Even more massive failures, due to widespread power outages, have been quite 
localized in their effects [11]. 
Successful attacks on many of the biggest hubs would have severe and 
pervasive effects. Hence, protection of major Internet hubs is a cornerstone of 
rational policy for cyberspace infrastructure defense, but keeping in mind that 
links that are logically and topologically separate may in fact be carried over the 
same physical communications infrastructure through multiplexing, via one 
fiber optic strand, or otherwise be vulnerable to the same damage agents. Thus, a 
single attack might take out thousands or tens of thousands of links, potentially 
cutting off multiple nodes from the network. The places where this can occur 
must be protected to assure cyberspace infrastructure integrity [1]. This is a 
particular concern for nodes located in geographically isolated sites (i.e., North 
Siberia, Far East of Russia), that are critical to national security. Loss of 
electricity does not ordinarily take down a major Internet hub – at least not at 
once, since most hubs have emergency backup power sources that can carry 
them for hours or even days.  
Most modern infrastructure systems face profound transformation as a 
result of the fast moving technological and market innovations. Inevitably, such 
transformation involves greater reliance on cyber technology to improve the 
efficiency and effectiveness of infrastructure operation, and thus potentially 
further increases opportunities for cyber attack. This presents an ongoing 
challenge to regulators, developers, and operators. 
Virtually all infrastructures of economic importance depend on 
information systems that are potentially the targets of cyber attacks. The latter 
can be classified by their intent as follows: 1) to provide information and garner 
specific knowledge needed for organizing a physical or cyber attack. The 
technique used here is similar to industrial espionage techniques; 2) to 
supplement a physical attack, in order to exacerbate the intended damage. These 
kind of attacks temporarily disable protective or corrective responses; 3) to 
damage or destroy critical physical nodes (for EG it would be electrical 
generators and large step-up and step-down transformers, for liquid pipelines--
pumps, valves; for gas pipelines--compressors, valves, etc.).This kind of attack 
is the most difficult to organize, as it needs perfect timing, near-synchronous 
execution and extensive and precise knowledge of the intrinsic mechanical and 
material properties of the object being attacked. 
With having in place operating personnel with high levels of diligence and 
compliance and security subsystems installed, the success of all types of cyber 
attacks on critical infrastructures can be severely limited and can be virtually 
nullified by rigorous reverse engineering. Reverse engineering is a way to 
design and operate existing infrastructures taking into full consideration system 
thinking of a malicious mind that is planning to execute a cyber attack on these 
objects. 
To impose strategic-level and lasting physical damage to any major 
infrastructure system widely-dispersed over a territory (communication, electric, 
oil, gas, water, etc.), multiple quasi-simultaneous physical attacks on their most 
vulnerable nodes are required. Attacks on second-level nodes (transmission 
towers, separate single power generators, compressors, pumps, etc.), may be 
locally disruptive and costly to infrastructure providers and users, but yield only 
restricted damage and partial decrease of its productivity.   
The design and manufacture of the damaged Iranian centrifuge cascade 
were inherently of marginal quality manufacture and inadequate materials for 
such highly stressed machines. It is doubtful whether Stuxnet or any other 
software worm would be successful against infrastructure systems with better 
design and more robust quality. 
Government regulators and industry groups in general seek to provide 
balanced and integrated protection not only against cyber threats but the entire 
spectrum of natural as well as malicious threats. Infrastructure firms in general 
recognize their strong economic interest in protecting themselves and their 
investments, and for the most part are reasonably willing to comply with the 
state regulations [1]. 
Critical Infrastructure Vulnerabilities 
Cyber Networks. The network levels that support and comprise 
cyberspace are run almost entirely remotely by computers without any direct 
human intervention. This opens widely the door to cyber exploitation and attack, 
to which they were more or less systematically subjected in the form of 
distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks (the most common form of attack), 
as well as a variety of exploitation attempts. Motivations for the DDoS include 
extortion, ransom, revenge, publicity for causes, etc.  
Reported intrusions [1, 3] have almost all been information-seeking, for 
criminal or obscure purposes. Remarkably, there have been no reports of 
coordinated cyber attacks attempting to exploit the damage and impede repair 
and recovery operations. But there is no guarantee that this will not change in 
the near future. 
The Electrical Grid (EG) is the infrastructure of greatest concern in 
connection with cyber attack. The potential problems and solutions for other 
infrastructures broadly parallel those of the grid. The cyber security of the 
Russian electrical grid has been the subject of intense and broadly-based 
research for nearly two decades, allowing some fairly trustable conclusions. The 
topology of Russian EG resembles the HAS network of  Fig.6, with some 
features of the UR network shown in Fig. 6, with each generation source, 
transmission substation, or distribution substation as a node and each line 
connection of two nodes as a link. In this kind of transmission networks hubs 
connected directly to large numbers of nodes are rare and most nodes have more 
than one link, except for those in the fringes of the north-east parts of the 
Russian EG.  
The fast and accelerating advent of the sixth tenor of technology will 
dramatically change the structure and layout of Russian electrical grids as it will 
become increasingly smart and hybrid, combining traditional energy generation 
(coal, oil, gas, atom) with renewable energy systems (hydro, sun, wind, ocean 
waves, bio-fuel, thermal, etc.), and some novel energy storage subsystems (high 
capacity batteries, flywheels, heat accumulators, etc.). 
Currently the Russian state-owned unified EG is comprised of a relatively 
small number of large central station plants, usually located in the vicinity of 
their energy sources (Fig. 6). Electricity is a bulk commodity that lacks 
specificity and is economically transmitted in the form of alternating current 
(AC) at high levels of energy and voltage, and most electrical use is AC at lower 
(220 v) voltages. Major production and transportation corridors are served by a 
few high-capacity HVAC lines along which distribution stations are located that 
feed local bulk users and local retail distribution networks, using the transformer 
as a passive device that allows economic tapping down high-voltage AC 
(HVAC) to lower voltage. The corridors follow the customers and, hence, are 
determined by economic geography (mostly, along the TransSiberian railroad). 
When the flow in an electricity network is near the limits of its capacity, 
the failure of one link could throw more load on remaining links than they can 
carry without overheating. This would lead to a cascade failure, due to 
overheating of links, one by one, or automatic /manual shutting them down to 
prevent damage. 
On an AC network, the current must alternate precisely at the same 
frequency everywhere in synchronous operation. Any failure of this frequency 
synchronization would produce unbalanced forces that could literally tear 
equipment apart. If local overloading drags the frequency of a generator down, 
then it and the area it serves must immediately be disconnected from the grid 
[1]. Synchronization failures also can cascade, as generation or transmission 
equipment drops offline to avoid catastrophic failures. Within each of the 
regional grids the frequency must be the same at any given instant; 
misalignment of frequency between regions can be tolerated only if they are 
connected by DC interconnections, which serve as trip for a major blackout. 
This scenario, on a wide scale, can cut the grid up into isolated islands, many or 
all of which might fail under local load imbalances [1]. 
 
Figure 6. Unified national electric grid of the European part of Russia [12] 
The loading on the grid varies from moment to moment. Users can 
randomly add loads by throwing a switch; generators and transmission 
equipment can go offline for a variety of reasons. Grid operators have a limited 
load-shedding capacity (temporarily cutting off customers who have bought 
“interruptible power” at reduced rates). In an emergency, a block of customers 
in a particular area may be blacked out to shed loads, but many systems are not 
set up to allow it to be done quickly, and utilities are reluctant to do this except 
as a last resort [1].  
Could such a failure cascade engulf large regions of Russia and adjacent 
countries – former parts of the Soviet Union like Belorussia or Kazakhstan – 
that are connected to the Russian EG? This scenario is highly unlikely, due to 
the fact that HVDC intertie lines isolate each region from frequency 
disturbances in other regions, and because disturbance from a major fault in the 
grid weakens as it disperses. 
Because every part of the grid influences every other part, it has been 
difficult to construct a deregulation regime that would allow the truly 
independent operation necessary for fully effective competition. The same 
limitations that permit participants to impose costs on others without inherent 
limits (other than those interposed by the remaining regulators) equally allow 
serious technical problems to develop and spread without any individual 
participating firm or organization having a clear interest in taking corrective 
action. 
The physics of electricity make it impossible for a fully disunited, every-
entity-for-itself EG operating regime. If the system is to operate stably and 
safely, there must be some consistent set of operating rules that everyone is 
constrained to obey. This realization has been somewhat slow in emerging, 
perhaps in part because authorities were thinking in terms of analogies with 
networks that were not as tightly coupled as the electricity grid and thus less in 
need of highly disciplined operation. 
SCADA and system management networks 
All modern EGs and other infrastructure networks with distributed 
equipment generally have as their components supervisory control and data 
acquisition (SCADA) networks. The earliest SCADA nets (in 1950s) were 
immune to any types of cyber attack because of their fully isolated from the 
outer world dedicated transmission channels. EG equipment generally has 
separate control and limiting systems (inherited, by the way, from the 
eighteenth century steam engines). According to this strategy a modern 
generator has several trips: over-speed, overvoltage, overpressure, etc. The 
SCADA controllers enable operator command and provide feedback control to 
reach and maintain the commanded state. The limiters limit damage from 
inadvertent or malicious improper operator commands as well as system 
failures; hence, if need be, they can override the controller inputs [1].  
Digitalization of SCADA (using programmable logic controllers PLCs 
that generally communicate digitally to a central computerized control system) 
while bringing important advantages of economy and efficiency also introduced 
potential vulnerabilities to cyber exploitation and attack. The energy 
management system (EMS) (or its equivalent in other types of infrastructure 
systems), which is at a level above SCADA, optimizes overall economics and 
feeds directions to the SCADA to adjust system operation accordingly. As both 
EMS and SCADA have been digitized the distinction between them has grown 
less clearly defined and they are often referred to as energy delivery control 
systems (EDCS). Standards for cyber security of EDCSs and their subsystems 
have been available since the mid-2000s. Nevertheless, examination and testing 
continue to reveal a series of common cyber vulnerabilities in many EDCSs 
[13].  
Analysis of major outages and blackouts worldwide from the cyber 
security point of view revealed EG design defects and demonstrated how tightly 
coupled the grid is and what this implies for its operation and protection [14]. It 
also discovered a number of hardware and software failures, together with faulty 
operational procedures and operator errors on the local and regional levels.  
The typical scenario of a blackout practically always includes a cascading 
effect. The trigger of such cascade of failures may vary. For instance, the 
immediate cause of the 2004 blackout in North America that involved 50 million 
people without electricity for a long time in winter was a series of instances in 
which high-voltage transmission lines contacted trees that had been allowed to 
grow too tall into the lines’ rights of way. Autonomous safety systems sensed 
the resulting ground faults and automatically disconnected the lines to prevent 
more serious damage and fires. The prevention of the cascade was not achieved 
due to poor training of the operators and their excessive reliance on limited and 
fallible warning and diagnosis systems [1].  
The future electric power grid, according to current research, will take the 
form of a cellular type smart grid with smart control, able to adapt to failures in 
real time with limited if any degradation [15], regulated by adaptive software 
rather than governmental agencies, and with provision to take advantage of 
distant power sources. This means that future EGs will depend even more on 
cyberspace. Hence, essential efforts are needed to improve the reliability and 
efficiency of power distribution without any increase of vulnerability to cyber 
exploitation and attack [16]. 
Cyber attacks against electrical grid targets can usually be expected only 
to exacerbate and/or impede response to physical defects or casualties, whether 
natural, accidental, or malicious in origin. For the most part, the potential of 
cyber attacks against undamaged, robust systems of modern design will remain 
limited to more or less temporary disruption of operation. Currently, the only 
known vulnerability (coined Aurora vulnerability AV) [17], [18], is the 
possibility to hack into the control system of an electric generator or other 
rotating electrical equipment connected to the grid and throw the equipment out 
of phase, causing severe physical damage to the equipment.  
The practical difficulty of doing wide-scale damage to the whole EG is 
increased by the heterogeneity of the equipment and control software, produced 
by several different manufacturers at different times. To damage a substantial 
portion of such EG a set of highly coordinated attacks would be needed. It 
would be easier to attack only a small number of key highly- connected nodes 
[19] to produce a big damage that would take many days and even weeks to 
repair/replace, restart and reintegrate the EG, because the supply of replacement 
high-voltage step-up transformers (needed to raise electromotive force to the 
levels needed for long-distance transmission) is limited, as is the capacity for 
manufacturing additional ones quickly. No means to destroy transformers purely 
by cyber attack has yet been revealed, but it would be unwise to assume that it 
could not be done in the future.  
Conclusions 
1. The SCADA and EMS networks should be robust enough to continue 
providing accurate information and positive control even if subjected to 
coordinated cyber attack. Moreover, it is essential that operators be trained and 
adequately prepared to act resourcefully and decisively in response to casualties. 
2. The foregoing examination of infrastructure protection issues has 
revealed that cyber attacks on physical infrastructures pose only a very limited 
strategic-level threat in and of themselves as long as right precautions are taken. 
This conclusion is broadly applicable to all well designed and manufactured 
major physical infrastructure systems. 
3. Undependable software is one of the greatest vulnerabilities of 
infrastructure systems. The cost-driven trend to wide use of undependable and 
open-source software is exacerbating the risks. Software dependability will not 
achieve the necessary standards unless effective systems engineering is 
mandated for infrastructure systems. 
4. While there is no clear limit to potential threats against infrastructures, 
there are limits to the resources that can be used for protection. Setting and 
keeping priorities for the allocation of financial and management resources are 
essential in order to provide effective protection. 
5. The integrity of infrastructures affects everyone in our society, and the 
public will demand that its views be heeded. Hence, the public should be 
informed fully, clearly and accurately about all possible and happening cyber 
threats/incidents. This will ensure that the public will feel confidence in those 
who direct infrastructure protection efforts and will pay appropriate attention to 
their recommendations. 
6. Policy direction for the various infrastructures should be tailored to 
their specific nature and needs. 
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